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Konrad H. Jarausch
Higher Education and Social Change:
Some Comparative Perspectives
Seemmgly self-evident, the relationship between higher education and social change
has proven elusive Social scientists have tended to focus on the practical reform of
both according to some normative conception, often obhvious to the disappoint-
ments of the past Histonans who dared address that numinous monstrosity calied
"modernization" have usually ignored education or treated it as a dependent vana¬
ble despite the insistence of many 19th Century observers that it was a significant Pro¬
moter of change
'
Those who have taken a closer look have been disappointed in
their effort to determine the general contribution of schooling to industnal develop¬
ment, unless they have focused more specifically on technical training Others who
have pondered the transmission of values have stressed the "actively incongruent"
role of higher learning in social upheavals based upon the largely traditional content
of the curnculum
2
Part of this confusion results from an excessively narrow view of
social change, hmited by and large to industriahzation From a broader Webenan
perspective, which includes rationalization, bureaucratization and professionaliza¬
tion as key processes, the role of education in the transformation of traditional so¬
ciety looms much larger Instead of a simphstic alternative which defines schooling
as either the passive product of society or the active motor of progress, the relation¬
ship between higher education and social change is circular and interdependent with
both transforming each other Not a deductive theoretical approach (be it functional-
lst or Marxist), but an inductive empincal study of one phase of their interaction is
therefore likely to yield clearer insights, as long as it is sufficiently systematic and
general3
R G Paulston, "Social and Educational Change Conceptual Frameworks," Comparative
Education Review, 21 (1977), 370-395, H U Wehler, Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte
(Gottingen, 1975), P N Stearns, European Society in Upheaval (New York, 1975), 2nd ed
P Lundgreen, Bildung und Wirtschaftswachstum im Jndustriahsterungsprozeß des 19 Jahr¬
hunderts (Berlin, 1973), F K Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe (Blooming
ton, 1979)
P V Meyers, The Modernization ofEducation in 19th Century Europe (St Louis, 1977) is but
a bnef sketch, H U Wehler, "Voruberlegungen zu einer modernen deutschen Gesellschafts
geschichte," in Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System (Bonn, 1978), for M Weber's
One such "seismic shift" is the emergence of "modern" higher education between
the middle ofthe 19th and the first third ofthe 20th centuries. During the develop¬
ment of a mature industrial society, a small, homogenous, elite and pre-professional
university turned into a large, diversified, middle-class and professional system of
higher learning. While its antecedents in the late 18th Century involve practical en-
lightenment as well as idealist neohumanist reforms, the major alterations in size, in¬
stitutional structure, social composition and career pattern of graduates took place
after initial industrialization before they were interrupted by the Great Depression
and the Second World War. But from the perspective of mass higher education dur¬
ing the middle of the 20th Century, these changes in higher learning were still limited
by institutional tradition and social constraints.4 Because the sequence, intensity and
manner of this central transformation differed in various highly industrial countries
of the West, a comparison can help isolate the relative importance of various causes.
The British experience of industrialization preceding educational mobilization con¬
trasts sharply with the German pattern of higher learning before economic growth,
with the Russian sequence of both developments imported in the Central European
mold and with the American way of both coinciding in time. Despite considerable
differences in cultural style, institutional tradition and educational policies, certain
developments, such as increases in size and complexity of institutions, cut across na¬
tional frontiers and modernized higher learning in all countries of the West. Hence it
is imperative to distinguish the common pattern from national peculiarities and vice
versa.5
In order to gain greater explanatory depth, such an analysis has to be limited in
several respects. The focus on higher education, defined loosely as post-secondary
schooling beginning at age 18, provides a distinctive subject matter with clear boun¬
daries. The common social approach to scientific research, liberal education or train¬
ing contributes greater cohesion, even if the methods vary from intellectual to quanti¬
tative history. Interdiseiplinary perspective produces a methodological tension be¬
tween historicist attention to the particular and social scientist penchant for generali¬
zation or modeling.6 Among the variety of issues, four themes seem to represent cru-
view of modernization; H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology
(New York, 1958).
4. L. Stone, "Introduction," in his The University in Society (Princeton, 1974) 2 vols. and the
successor collection on Schooling and Society (Baltimore, 1976); for a similar periodization
Stearns, European Society, 179 ff; Ringer, Education, 52 ff. The mid-19th Century offers a
convenient starting point also because statistics become more available and reliable while
the Second World War disrupted time series or changed their units drastically.
5. France was excluded for reasons of space and dissimilarity of institutions (i. e., no universi¬
ties until the late 19th Century), A. Prost, Histoire de Venseignment en France 1800-1967 (Pa¬
ris, 1969). For similar comparative attempts, P. Flora, Quantitative Historical Sociology (The
Hague, 1977); H. Kaelble, Historische Mobilitätsforschung (Darmstadt, 1978); Ringer, Educa¬
tion and Society, passim.
6. For the social history of education, E. Rury, "Elements of a 'New* Comparative History of
Education," Comparative Education Review, 21 (1977), 342-51; H. Graff, "'The New Math,'
Quantification the 'New* History and the History of Education," Urban Education, 11
(1977), 403-40 and the discussion at the History of Education Society Meeting at Washing¬
ton in November 1979.
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cial aspects of the transformation. First, the absolute and relative expansion of en-
rollments provides a basic numerical indicator of the spread of higher learning and
of the growth of its social importance. Second, institutional diversification ap¬
proaches the internal differentiation of universities in terms of teaching subjects and
research institutes as well as the proliferation of institutions in the technical and
commercial fields. Third, the opening of recruitment raises the question of educa¬
tional elitism or mobility during the second half ofthe 19th Century and examines the
university in terms of its societal clientele. Finally, the process of professionalization
analyzes the relationship between institutionalized learning and the spread of the
professions in terms of their scientific bases, practical training or state credentialling.
While any number of other problems, such as scientific progress, educational fi¬
nances or university governance, could also have been discussed, these four dynamic
processes emphasize change and facilitate comparison.7
Although American academics are sometimes defensive and hesitate to investigate
their own institutions, their Continental colleagues at the turn of the Century were
convinced of their own importance:
The greatly admired level of civilization in Germany is living proof ofthe immeasurable value of
the universities. Did not the culture which has now spread through every Stratum of society issue
chiefly from this primary and most copious source? More importantiy this is where the great dis-
coveries in the natural sciences were made, to whose practical application communication and
commerce owe their progress. Here the principles ofthe rule of law were developed and taught.
Here the moving ideas of economic progress were conceived, which public life struggles to im¬
plement. Here the spirits have matured who have succeeded in grasping the great truths of pres¬
ent and past reality and by teaching have made them the intellectual property ofthe people. Did
not the universities nurture the spark of patriotism and of political honor in the darkest hours?
Did not the salvation of the fatherland proceed from the universities in the hour of greatest
need?
Somewhat exaggerating the active impact of higher education on society, contempo¬
rary self-consciousness demonstrates that for professors and students alike higher
learning involved the spread of civilization, the advancement of science and the
propagation of modern nationalism.8 Seen in a broader context, the history of higher
education is too important to be left to the vagaries of anniversary tributes to yet an¬
other illustrious alma mater. Instead it needs to be firmly integrated into the general
discussion of social change in order to determine the university's contribution to
"modernization" as well as to the perpetuation of traditional elites, values and
styles.9 Although the "most important questions" concerning not only arrangements
7. The topics emerged out of K. H. Jarausch, "The Social Transformation of the University:
The Case of Prussia, 1865-1914," Journal of Social History, 12 (1979), 609-636; "Frequenz
und Struktur. Zur Sozialgeschichte der Studenten im Kaiserreich," in P. Baumgart, ed., Bil¬
dungspolitik in Preußen zur Zeit des Kaiserreichs (Stuttgart, 1980), 119-149.
8. A. Langguth, "Bilanz der akademischen Bildung," Burschenschaftliche Bücherei (Berlin,
1901), 1, 303-64; C. E. McClelland, State, Society and University in Germany, 1700-1914
(Cambridge, 1980).
9. M. Steinmetz, "Laufende Arbeiten zur Geschichte der Universitäten und Hochschulen auf
dem Territorium der DDR," paper delivered at the meeting ofthe International Commission
on the History of Universities at the XV. International Congress of Historical Sciences in
Bucharest, August 11-12, 1980; for the disparate State ofthe field see the 19 resumes ofthe
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but also purposes deal mostly with intangibles, a comparative framework for the
study of higher learning requires, whenever possible, quantitative answers, marrying
social, as it were, to intellectual history.10
The Dynamics of Expansion:
A basic index of the internal structure and external influence of a system of higher
education is its enrollment. "Major changes in the size of the Student body are the
structural pivots around which the history of the university has to be built," since
large scale Swings of attendance "not only have obvious and far-reaching effects on
the economics, the architecture and the teaching arrangements of the university, they
also have profound repercussions on its intellectual life." Because institutional fig¬
ures and government statistics are often inflated, a first task is the reconstruction of
the pattern of expansion in each of the four countries concerned. Previous attempts
to measure absolute or relative growth have encountered three particular difficulties:
Comparisons based on highly aggregated figures tend to be unreliable, if not mis¬
leading, because of varying degrees of inaccuracy and incompleteness of the num¬
bers on which they are based. More sophisticated efforts have been frustrated by the
unit of measurement problem of which institutions (and consequently students)
should or should not be included in "higher education." Finally, cross-national com¬
parisons built on age-cohort representation indices have found it difficult to focus on
comparable spans of years among the population as base.11 Fortunately these obsta¬
cles can be partiaUy overcome by reaggregating data in individual settings from be¬
low, by defining higher learning not only legally (according to government practice)
but also functionally (as post-secondary) and temporarily (18-year-olds and above)
and by calculating the index of inclusiveness on the basis of empirically determined
average length of study which is then compared to the relevant age group. The frag¬
mentary evidence suggests three overriding questions: What was the absolute growth
in Student numbers? Which types of institutions contributed to it? How did the ex¬
pansion of higher learning relate to population increase?
Communications by the participants at the congress, printed in Rapports (Bucharest, 1980), 3:
323-360.
10. K. H. Jarausch, ed., Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft. Probleme und Möglich¬
keiten (Düsseldorf, 1976); M. Kaplan, "The Most Important Questions," Oxford Review of
Education, 3 (1977), 87-94; G. Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography (Middle¬
town, 1975); J. Kocka, Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen, 1977); J. Henretta, "Social History as
Lived and Written," American Historical Review, 84 (1979), 1293-1333.
11. Stone, "The Size and Composition ofthe Oxford Student Body 1580-1909," University in
Society, 1: 22 ff; C. E. McClelland, "A Step Forward in the Study of Universities," Minerva,
14(1976), 150-161; F. K. Ringer, "Problems in the History of Higher Education," Compara¬
tive Studies in Society and History, 19 (1977), 239 ff; Flora, Quantitative Historical Sociology,
56ff; Ringer, Education and Society, passim; H. Kaelble, "Educational Opportunities and
Government Policies: Postprimary European Education before 1914," in P. Flora and A. J.
Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of the Welfare State in Europe (New Brunswick,
1981).
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In all four countries Student numbers rose so dramatically during the three-quarter
Century that higher learning multiplied at an average of ten times (Table l).12 The
Table 1: Absolute University Enrollment
country:
year:
Britain
stud. univ.
Germany
stud. univ.
Russ
stud.
ia
univ.
United
stud.
States
univ./ col
1860/ 1 3,385 5 12,188 20 5,000 9 22,464
1870/ 1 5,560 13,206 6,538 31,900 560
1880/1 10,560 21,209 8,045 49,300
1890/1 16,013 28,621 13,169 72,250
1900/ 1 17,839 33,739 16,357 100,000
1910/1 26,414 53,364 37,901 144,800
1920/1 34,591 86,367 109,200 251,750
1930/1 37,255 16 97,692 23 43,600 21 489,500 1,400
growth: 11 time!3 8 times 9-22 times 22 times
Note: British figures inciude both Old Universities and New Rrovincial Universities.
German figures are for the Empire (less Strassburg after World War One) and
inciude only universities. Russian figures inciude Warsaw and Dorpat until World
War One. Because there is no precise American equivalent to the European univer¬
sity sector, an approximate estimate of U.S. dynamics was based on one half of
the enrollment in Colleges and universities together with the entire enrollment
in the professional schools, since these were clearly of university-like status
and function. The U.S. figures were computed from informed estimates of the
college/university, professional school, and normal school/teacherfs College
enrollment, provided by C. B. Burke. Since they were for males in 1860 and for
both males and females thereafter, they somewhat overstate expansion.
most rapid decades of growth were the 1870s and 1880s as well as the last pre-war
years and once again the 1920s. While the German universities, with the highest level
of initial attendance, expanded more slowly, Russian and British institutions grew
strongly, and American Colleges increased astoundingly since their students were
younger and academic Standards were less rigorous. Despite this considerable in¬
crease in the traditional university sector, the newer forms of higher education
mushroomed even more quickly, 13-17 times in relatively restrictive Britain and Ger-
12. Tables 1 to 3 are based on the essays of R. Lowe, H. Titze, P. Aiston and C. Burke as well as
on Ringer and Kaelble, cited in N. 11; the German figures are from R. Riese, Die Hochschule
auf dem Wege zum wissenschaftlichen Großbetrieb (Stuttgart, 1977), 339ff; C. Quetsch, The
Numerical Record of University Attendance in Germany in the Last Fifty Years (Berlin, 1961),
51; K. H. Manegold, Universität, Technische Hochschule und Industrie (Berlin, 1970), 320 f;
W. Hoffmann, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft (Berlin, 1965), 172 ff.
13
many, and 36-66 times in the more inclusive American and Russian Systems (Table
2). Much of this dynamism was due to the explosion of higher technical education
and to the expansion of teacher training, which slowly reached equality with older
disciplines and institutions. Even relative to the population (which doubled in this
period) the expansion was still so substantial that one is tempted to call it an educa¬
tional mobilization, since it not only reflects demographic growth but goes considera¬
bly beyond it (Table 3). The century-long contraction of higher education was ar-
rested in the first decades ofthe 19th Century; but only after 1850 did this reversal
turn into sustained educational growth. Not surprisingly the most limited system was
the British with only about 1.9% ofthe 20- to 24-year-old cohort enrolled in higher
education. By 1930 the Germans were still somewhat more inclusive at 2.61% of the
same age span, while the Russian spurt after the 1905 revolution and then again in
the early and late 1920s raised the levels of inclusiveness to 4.3% of the age group in
1939. With the most open and varied structure, the United States was clearly ahead
of all other developed nations with 11.25% of a 5-year age cohort going to College,
graduate or professional school. Hence the German and British rates of increase
were the lowest (five to six times), the American, starting at a higher level, somewhere
in the middle (6.5) and the Soviet, calculated in terms of proportion among 10,000 of
the population, the most dramatic (14), since they had the furthest to go. This sub¬
stantial, but still limited, expansion beyond population growth made higher educa¬
tion accessible to a considerably larger segment ofthe relevant age group.13
Contemporaries already speculated about the causes of "this rapid increase in the
number of our students." While academic boosters invoked "progress" or "democra¬
tization," statisticians offered "the high social esteem" of college graduates, "the uni¬
versal spread of classical culture" and the "commercial depression" as reasons.14 Al¬
though their relative weight differed according to context, about a handful of direct
and indirect factors seems to have been involved. (1) While in Germany growth
mainly occured in already existing institutions, in Britain (trebling), Russia (doub¬
ling) and the United States (more than doubling) a considerable part of the expan¬
sion was due to the foundation of new Colleges and universities. (2) Especially impor¬
tant for the increase beyond population growth was the lowering of admissions bar-
riers which allowed women (from 1/5 to 1/2 ofthe system by 1930), graduates of
13. Since the British indices of Kaelble and Lowe dovetail, they seem credible (except for Kael-
ble's sudden jump between 1910 and 1920, which is likely to be based on a difference in in¬
clusion of institutions). Ringer's, Kaelble's and Jarausch's German figures roughly coincide
(when one makes allowance for the differential age-spans), but Jarausch's emphasize greater
dynamism. Although there are no comparable figures for Russia from other authors, the in¬
dex compiled by P. Aiston rests on a comparison of students with 20-24 year olds. While
widely used, the proportion of students per 10,000 of population tends to be misleading,
since the composition of various populations is likely to differ in age and therefore the com¬
parable cohort is not always the same size. The trend direction of all U.S. figures is similar;
Burke's are the most inclusive, consistent over time, self-compiled and also reliable.
14. H. von Petersdorff, "Der Zudrang zu den Deutschen Hochschulen," Akademische Blätter, 4
(1888/9), 3f; J. Conrad, German Universities during the Last Fifty Years (Glasgow, 1885),
19 ff; F. Eulenburg, Die Frequenz der deutschen Universitäten von ihrer Gründung bis zur Ge¬
genwart (Leipzig, 1906), 250ff
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modern high schools (such as the Realgymnasia and Oberrealschulen in Germany
after 1900), minorities (hke the Jews in Russia after 1905) and foreigners access to
higher learning which had previously been denied (3) Moreover, this emergence of a
"compensatory" sector of higher education of lower prestige and also lower prere-
quisites in applied technology (the Russian special Institutes) and teacher education
(the normal schools etc) provided "soft" options unavaüable before (4) Similarly,
the cooptation of new cumcula into extant institutions (such as commercial training
in Germany or home economics in the United States) made their offenngs more at-
tractive and vocationally relevant than the older prestige professions (5) Finally,
once begun, rapid expansion fed upon itself, since higher education, acting as lead
sector, absorbed the majority of its own graduates to sustain the growth in secondary
schools, universities and non-university institutions
15
Among the broader, indirect reasons, increasing demand appears to have been as
important as rising supply (1) Although often mvoked, population growth seems at
best to have been a necessary but not sufficient precondition, since it did not always
translate directly into expansion of higher learning (as in the second half of the 18th
Century), unless first channeled through a secondary education system (2) Despite
occasional short-range negative correlations with the business cycle, economic
growth seems to have been imperative as an underlying condition both as a con¬
sumption good (more affordable with the spread of prosperity) and as an increas¬
ingly necessary job prerequisite because of the academization of business and the
standardization of careers Though difficult to measure, rising demand for educated
manpower (apparent as favorable career prospects for academic professions) exerted
a powerful attraction for secondary school graduates (3) The pull of social prestige
operated somewhat more nebulously since many scholars presuppose a desire for up¬
ward mobility without explaining how it comes about Higher education became a
coveted avenue of social mobihty when status was no longer ascribed (as in an estate
society) but attained by individual effort (as in a liberal class system) (4) Although
educational policies tried to foster economic growth, the state, in Russia and Ger¬
many suspicious of oversupply, often affected the labor market more by expanding
the higher civil service Only after World War One did conscious attempts to create
equality of educational opportunity begin to have an impact on enrollments (as in
Russia in the 1920s) (5) Finally, the reversal of cultural attitudes after the enhghten-
ment in favor of neohumamsm and scientific research seems to have translated only
hesitantly into greater Student numbers although it no doubt contnbuted in the long
run to the vitahty ofthe arts and sciences (in the U S , Bntain and Germany) A com-
panson of causes of enrollment expansion therefore does not suggest a tight model,
but rather a diffuse set of internal and external factors, generally related to moderni¬
zation, which need to be proven more explicitly
16
15 R A Lowe, The English School Its Architecture and Organization (Birmingham, 1977)
H Titze, Die Politisierung der Erziehung Untersuchungen über die soziale und die pohtische
Funktion der Erziehung von der Aufklarung bis zum Hochkapttalismus (Frankfurt 1973)
P L Aiston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia (Stanford, 1969) C B Burke,
Amencan CoUegiate Populations (New York, 1982)
16 For a somewhat more ambitious approach see J E Craig and N Spear, The Dynamics of
Educational Expansion A Methodological and Conceptual Framework," paper presented
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Often treated only in passing, the implications of the enrollment expansion for the
emergence of the modern system were considerable. When it was allowed to operate
unchecked (unlike in Russia where it was bureaucratically controlled to eliminate
dissent), the dynamism of attendance resulted in liberal-capitalist market cycies of
varying length. In each major field or faculty, growth would produce "an excess of
educated men" in a career which would discourage students and eventuaUy make
numbers decline absolutely or relatively until the demand for graduates was restored,
when the whole cycle (with some delay) would be set into motion again. For instance,
in Germany this mechanism produced academic unemployment crises in the 1790s,
1830s, 1890s and 1920s. The consequences of expansion for institutional structure,
social access and professional training, therefore, need further consideration. Not
only in the U.S. did self-sustained system's growth create the first mass universities
and a near chaos of hierarchically ranked, but competing, centers of higher learning.
The persistence of inequality of educational opportunity which both helped and hin¬
deret the enrollment expansion also requires more debate. Whereas aspirations for
mobility pulled many lower middle class youths into higher education during favora¬
ble prospects, oversupply crises discouraged lower class pupils from continuing their
education while only deflecting privileged sons from one attractive career to another.
Nevertheless the overall growth in Student numbers eventuaUy produced more grad¬
uate professionals which furthered the academization of government and business.
Educational expansion should, therefore, not be taken for granted, since its pattern,
causes and consequences pose a number of unresolved questions, such as the contin¬
ued growth in liberal education in the U.S.17
The Diversification of Institutions:
A second major aspect of the transformation of higher learning is the process of insti¬
tutional diversification. Around the turn of this Century academic observers began to
discuss the emergence of Großwissenschaft or of the Großbetrieb der Wissenschaft as
scientific "counterpart to large scale industrial enterprise" and to big government.18
In contrast to the small, intimate, semi-monastic institutions of earlier times, the
large, impersonal scholarly factories were animated by a new spirit and developed
novel complex structures. For instance, the universities of Berlin and Moscow en¬
rolled about 10,000 students on the eve of the war. Although one dimension of this
at the Comparative and International Education Society Conference (Vancouver, 1980);
C. A. Anderson and M. J. Bowman, "Education and Economic Modernization in Perspective,"
in L. Stone, Schooling and Society (Baltimore, 1976), 3-19.
17. D. K. Müller, Sozialstruktur und Schulsystem. Aspekte zum Strukturwandel des Schulwesens
im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1977) and "Modellentwicklung zur Analyse von Krisen¬
phasen im Verhältnis von Schulsystem und staatlichem Beschäftigungssystem," Zeitschrift
für Pädagogik, 14. Beiheft (Weinheim, 1977), 37-77; U. Hermann and G. Friedrich, "Qualifi¬
kationskrise und Schulreform. Berechtigungswesen, Überfüllungdiskussion und Lehrer¬
schwemme," ibid., 13 (1977), 309-325.
18. T. Mommsen, "Antwort an Harnack, den 3. Juli, 1890," Reden und Aufsätze (Berlin, 1905),
209 f; A. Wagner, Die Entwicklung der Universität Berlin, 1810-1896 (Berlin, 1896); A. Har¬
nack, "Vom Großbetrieb der Wissenschaft," Preußische Jahrbücher, 119 (1905), 193-201.
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growing diversity is the proliferation of research disciplines investigated by J. Ben-
David, the process is broader and more encompassing, since it also includes the
emergence of new types of higher learning, which differ in prestige, and the estab¬
lishment of new teaching specialties, which only sometimes coincide with fields of
knowledge and inciude higher and lower training levels. A broader taxonomy sug¬
gested by B. R. Clark defines "differentiation" as occurring among institutions in ho¬
rizontal (various sectors) or vertical (hierarchical) directions or as taking place within
institutions along horizontal (scholarly sections) or vertical (tiers of training) lines. In
this framework the central comparative questions become: How much differentiation
did the expansion of institutional size produce in contrast to earlier decades? Along
which of the four axes did the transformation diversify the character of higher learn¬
ing most dynamically? Did differentiation operate unchecked or was there not also a
countervaüing tendency towards institutional convergence on the pure research mod¬
el? Because national, cultural and administrative peculiarities render quantitative
comparisons difficult, the discussion of differentiation remains somewhat impres-
sionistic, although within individual countries it can and must be based on hard nu¬
merical evidence.19
Because "differentiation is then in part an accumulation of historical deposits," its
elusive processes can be most easily identified on the external level between institu¬
tions. The fundamental mechanisms in all four countries appear to be the adding-on
of new types, the upgrading of existing secondary institutions and the transformation
of their function towards the traditional university ideal. Since cloning of universities
themselves was relatively slow and their size could not be stretched indefinitely, the
simplest response to growth pressures was the addition of new sectors such as the
commercial Colleges and administrative or pedagogical academies in Germany
after the turn of the Century (Table 4). Rarely, if ever, were they completely new, but
rather built like the Technische Hochschulen on older secondary polytechnics, which
were raised to tertiary rank in 1875, and after a protracted struggle received formal
equality in 1900 so that they are today known as technical universities. However the
price of legal and social recognition was often the adoption of the traditional univer¬
sity ethos or governance and the transformation of the curriculum towards pure
rather than applied research and towards the humanities. Some institutions, like the
British redbricks, altered their entire mission from higher technical training towards
the traditional university function. This horizontal differentiation was accompanied
by vertical diversification as well, since relatively homogenous Systems developed an
elaborate set of formal and informal hierarchies. Even after the achievement of legal
parity, the older core universities such as Oxbridge continued to overshadow the new
civic universities, who in turn lorded it over the teacher's Colleges and technical Col¬
leges. Only in Russia did the technological institutes triumph completely over univer¬
sity nauka. But everywhere the applied institutions of higher learning began to
threaten the numerical predominance of their eider scientific sisters. In the United
States this vertical differentiation led to the establishment of recognized successive
19. J. Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study (Engelwood Cliffs, 1971);
B. R. Clark, "Academic Differentiation in National Systems of Higher Education," Compa¬
rative Education Review, 22 (1978), 242-258; introductory comments by J. Herbst on diver¬
sification at the "Education and Social Change" Conference, March 1980.
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Table 4: The Non-University Share of Higher Education
England Germany Russia United States
1860 38.6 15.2 32.4
1870 31,2 23.0 48.4
1880 22.1 18.5 20.0 58.0
1890 16.3 18.7 54.0
1900 28.0 29.3 26.0 53.8
1910 36.6 21.8 36.0 59.2
1920 44sl 31.9 24.0 60.9
1930 43.7 27.6 73.0 58.3
Note: These percentages for non-university enrollments were calculated
for Britain and Germany by dividing the figures in Table 2 by those in Table
1. The Russian figures are taken from Table 3 of J. McClelland, "Diversifica¬
tion in Russian-Soviet Education." Although there is no clearly definable
university sector in America, the non-university share for the U.S. was
estimated by taking one half of the college and university enrollment together
with the normal school and teachers college figures from C. B. Burke. The
high point of university dominance in each country is indicated by a ,
whereas the zenith of non-university enrollment is marked by a ....
tiers of higher education, with high school diplomas becoming a college entrance re¬
quirement and undergraduate preparing for professional and graduate study.20 By
the first third of the present Century the institutional matrix had diversified to an ex¬
tent that, except for Germany, higher education was hardly any longer synonymous
with the university.
Since the internal differentiation within institutions of higher learning is less
clearly understood, it might help to conceptualize developments as suggested by the
German evidence.21. First, the personnel structure of universities appears to have
20. Clark, "Academic Differentiation," 250ff; S. Rothblatt, The Revolution ofthe Dons: Cam¬
bridge and Society in Victorian England (New York, 1968); P. Lundgreen, Techniker in
Preußen während derfrühen Industrialisierung. Ausbildung und Berufsfeld einer entstehenden
sozialen Gruppe (Berlin, 1975); J. A. McClelland, Autocrats and Academics: Education, Cul¬
ture and Society in Tsarist Russia (Chicago, 1979); J. A. McLachlan, "The American College
in the Nineteenth Century: Toward a Reappraisal," Teachers College Record, 80 (1978),
287-306.
21. R. Riese, Die Hochschule auf dem Wege zum wissenschaftlichen Großbetrieb, 94 ff; K. D.
Bock, Strukturgeschichte der Assistentur. Personalgefüge, Wert- und Zielvorstellungen in der
deutschen Universität des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Düsseldorf, 1972); R. Rürup, ed., Wissen¬
schaft und Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Technischen Universität Berlin (Berlin,
1979).
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shifted from füll professors (over half in Berlin 1810) towards assistant professors
(51% by 1909). Senior scholars had less and less Student contact (the ratio deterio¬
rated from 21 to 64 students per professor) so that three quarters of all courses were
taught by untenured faculty. Below them a whole new category of Assistenten (re¬
search and teaching assistants, often with a Ph.D.) emerged to staff proseminars and
laboratories, whose labor was often exploited and who were denied participation in
academic self-government. Second, the number of teaching fields and subfields con¬
tinued to multiply, since the same course was not simply subdivided into sections,
but rather new variants of basic lectures were developed together with novel subspe-
cialities (which sometimes proved ephemeral). While the total number of offerings
tripled in Berlin from 571 in 1860 to 1677 in 1909, modern history, which had been
taught by the legendary L. von Ranke in 1871, fragmented into üwq courses (by Stern¬
feld, Breysig, Schmitt, Schiemann and Hintze) in 1914, a specialization which was
even more thorough in the technical subjects. Not only did earlier innovations spread
through the entire national system, but the center of Instruction shifted from lectures
to seminars (their ratio changed 6.1 to 1 towards 2.9 to 1 at Berlin). Third, in research,
the seminar and the institute proliferated as the focus of activity, especially in the hu¬
manities, sciences, medicine and even more so in technology. In Heidelberg the three
original seminars were joined by 23 others before World War One and the natural
science institutes doubled in number and expanded in size so that research shifted
out of the individual scholarly study or home laboratory into a large, well financed
facility. Although this proliferation of junior faculty, teaching specialities and re¬
search disciplines continued the impetus ofthe early 19th Century, its intensification
and spread to lesser institutions created the modern diversified university.
Only a tentative list of factors commonly advanced as explanations can be offered
at this point. (1) While the explosion of Student numbers in some areas justified div¬
ersification (like in the humanities), it failed to produce this effect in others (such as
law, which handled them with only a few faculty members). (2) Although the profes¬
sional research imperative created numerous subfields within established disciplines
such as medicine, it had apparently somewhat less effect on the natural sciences and
can therefore not simply be used as general cause without further qualification. (3)
Undoubtedly the academic labor market influenced the differential rates of diversifi¬
cation of faculties or institutions, but demand for graduates was often fickle and un¬
predictable. While established professions (such as medical doctors) could manipu¬
late it, "scientification" was less successful in the natural sciences where profession¬
als (industrial chemists) were weaker. (4) Donors and philanthropists, as in the cele¬
brated case ofthe Cavendish laboratory, facilitated the establishment of new institu¬
tions (University of Chicago, Stanford) or institutes. But their impact was heaviest in
capital intensive fields (such as technology) and in countries with private higher edu¬
cation (such as in the United States and Russia). (5) Similarly academic, professional,
business or political groups might speed the foundation of a new chair or the grant-
ing of parity for the technical Colleges (like the German Vdl, association of engi-
neers), but as often as not they failed to convince the public and the government to
grant university admission as to the Prussian primary schools teachers (DLV). (6) Ob¬
viously government policy, whether as general wülingness to fund (as Prussia under
Friedrich Althoff) or in specific targeting of growth (as Russia in the non-subversive
institutes) played an enormous role. But students were not always willing to follow so
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that some heavily supported sectors like engineering and agriculture in the U.S. dif¬
ferentiated professional^ without adequate audience among academic youth. (7) Fi¬
nally, the structure of the scientific community seems to have been important in slow-
ing down fragmentation in older, more theoretical disciplines and allowing greater
latitude in newer, largely applied fields of uncertain cognitive boundaries. These am¬
biguities and ironies indicate that causes of differentiation should be less confidently
postulated than cautiously documented in each particular instance.22
The dynamics of diversification also had some important consequences. Internal
institutional differentiation furthered the emergence of the academic career as a se¬
quential profession with restricted room at the top, which on the continent created
the Ordinarienuniversität, controlled and run for the chairholders. Moreover discipli¬
nary specialization led to the loss of philosophical unity and the increasing erosion
of "liberal education" in favor of research training or professional preparation. At
the same time the traditional fusion of Forschung und Lehre began to break down,
since the gap between teaching and research widened to such an extent that much
scientific innovation was carried on in semi-autonomous institutes, supported by
foundations like the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. External differentiation between
institutions began to threaten the autonomy of higher education, since the necessary
increase of state funding allowed the educational bureaucracy to exert greater policy
control even in those countries like England and the U.S. where formal governmental
interference was minimal. Moreover, the establishment of scientific institutes and
more so independent technological institutions linked higher learning more closely
to the mature industrial economy. In some sectors, like electronics, chemicals or ma¬
chine building, industry began to rely not only on basic but also applied research at
the Technische Hochschulen or Russian institutes. Finally the emergence of competing
centers of higher learning with somewhat different educational missions created a
status hierarchy of institutional types, which offered compensatory social access but
also condemned the more "modern" sectors to continuing inferiority unless they
conformed to the older neo-classical mold. As a counterpoint these centrifugal forces
created centripetal trends like informal research networks, formal scholarly associa¬
tions (American Historical Association) and regional accrediting associations (North
Central) which unified specialities, disciplines and institutions in an academic com¬
munity. Ironically the dialectical result of this double differentiation was therefore a
growing convergence on the new type of a modernized, diversified higher education
conglomerate.23
22. The generational element, mentioned by Sheldon Rothblatt, also comes into play, but in it¬
self is rarely enough to explain the process, since age tension may lead to conformity as well
as to innovation. Cf. A. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem of Generations," American Histori¬
cal Review, 78 (1973), 1353-85.
23. S. Rothblatt, Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education (London, 1976); F. Pfetsch,
Zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftspolitik in Deutschland (Berlin, 1974); R. R. Locke, "The
End of Practical Man: Higher Education and the Institutionalization of Entrepreneurial
Performance in France, Germany and Great Britain, 1880-1940" (MS Hawaii, 1981); J. A.
McClelland, "The Mystique of Nauka: Science and Scholarship in the Service ofthe Peo¬
ple," appearing in a volume edited by T. G. Stavrou (1981).
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The Opening of Recruitment:
Another important dimension of the transformation of higher learning was the
broadening of social recruitment of students and, thereby ultimately, also of profes¬
sors. While turn-of-the-century apologists of the university claimed that "the posses-
sors of academic culture ... come from all classes of society", critics charged that
"higher education is a right, reserved for the rieh, but inaccessible for the great mass
ofthe people". Statistically documenting the existence of such inequality, some well-
known social scientists as R. Dahrendorf, P. Bourdieu and Ch. Jencks have debated
the reasons for discrimination and argued vigorously for compensatory policies, fa¬
voring working class children, religious minorities, rural youths, women and blacks.24
Since in the 19th Century the liberal principle of equality of opportunity became gen¬
erally accepted, the discussion largely revolves around evaluative perspectives of
time and place. Viewed against the backdrop of earlier elitism, almost any broaden¬
ing of access seems progressive; seen in terms of more recent egalitarian advances,
earlier openings appear insignificant. Part ofthe difficulty also lies in the problem of
measuring the relative "social openness" of higher learning in contrast to other time
periods and countries. While published government figures are often designed to
cover up important analytical distinctions, social Classification schemes are largely
incompatible, especially when applied across boundaries or temporal eras. In order
to compare at all the historian is forced to run the double risk of employing catego¬
ries whose internal meaning changes over time and varies in different countries, con-
soling himself with the notion of functional equivalence. Fortunately the procedures
of measurement, such as indices of representation, are less controversial and can be
refined by focusing on the youth-population at risk.25 Therefore questions about the
recruitment of higher education abound: Did educational opportunities increase or
decrease with industrialization? What were the national or continental patterns of ac¬
cess? What were the causes and consequences ofthe partial social opening?
The fragmentary comparative evidence from 1860 to 1930 suggests that the social
recruitment of higher learning altered significantly in all four countries (Table 5).26
24. F. Paulsen, The German Universities- Their Character and Histoncal Development (New
York, 1895), 110 ff; the Socialist deputies Strobel and Liebknecht in the Prussian Landtag on
April 25, 27 and June 13, 1910, Stenographische Berichte des Abgeordnetenhauses, vol 544,
R. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (Garden City, 1967), P Bourdieu and
J. C. Passeron, Les Hentiers Les etudiants et la culture (Paris, 1966), Ch Jencks, Inequalm A
Reassessment ofthe Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York, 1972)
25. Ringer, Education and Society, 22ff; H Kaelble, "Educational Opportunities and Govern¬
ment Policies," passim: R. Boudon, Education, Opportunity and Social Inequahty (New
York, 1975); C. A. Anderson, "The Social Status of University Students in Relation to the
Type of Economy," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, 5 (1956), 51-
63.
26. For the sources of Table 5 see L. Stone, "The Size and Composition of the Oxford Student
Body," 103; J. Floud, "The Educational Experience ofthe Adult Population in England,"
in: D. Glass, ed., Social Mobility m Bntain (London, 1954), 137f; K. H. Jarausch, "The So¬
cial Transformation of the University," 625; H. Kaelble, Histonsche Mobihtatsforschung,
102; A. Rashin, "Gramatnosf i narodnoe obresovanie v Rossn," Istoncheskie zaptski, 37
(1951), 78; V. R. Leikina-Svirskaia, lntelhgentsiia v Rossu (Moscow, 1971), 62-4, J McClel-
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Although partly a definitional artifact (landed elites are no longer identifiable in the
20th Century), the nobility and the traditional agrarian upper class all but disap¬
peared from higher education, both relatively and somewhat less so absolutely Simi¬
larly the educated professionals, half of which had, m the middle ofthe 19th Century,
recruited themselves, dechned in importance to about 1/5 ofthe Student body Their
place was taken in the 1890s by the new commercial and entrepreneunal elite (with
between 1/5 and 2/5 of all students) as logical alternative Stratum with sufficient
means to afford post-secondary training After the turn of the Century, the entire up¬
per middle class was outstnpped by students from lower-middle-class homes, who,
with the spread of prosperity, began to supply about half of the students Although in
the mid-19th Century the traditional calhngs of artisan, shopkeeper and peasant had
made up the bulk of petit bourgeois representation, by the 1930s the newer service
pursuits such as white collar employees, middhng and lower officials, schoolteach-
ers, etc overshadowed them (in Germany by 2-to-l) Initially almost totally excluded,
the working class breached the educational barner after the First World War, espe¬
cially in Russia, but also to some extent in Bntain and in non-ehte U S institutions
hke Temple While the German pattern reveals this sequence first, the English figures
follow it (especially when one assumes a less elitist east for the redbneks) and exceed
it in terms of working class access by 1930 In the Russian case an educated middle
class first had to be created out of the nobility before the lower middle class could
emerge as the strongest parent Stratum, and the astounding 38 4 lower class propor¬
tion in 1927/28 is a result ofthe conscious proletanamzation policy ofthe Bolshe-
viks While the Penn figures for the U S demonstrate both the breakthrough of "or¬
dinary" sons after 1890 and the tenacity ofthe ehte after 1910, the multi-college 1925
sample shows a preponderance of business (50%) over professional or service (ca
42%) chentele and a respectable but restricted working class representation Finally,
institutional differentiation also produced a remarkable pattern of access differences
Within universities some units (such as cathohc theology) tended to be more accessi¬
ble than others (such as law), some tiers, such as undergraduate Instruction, were
more open than others, such as professional schools (medical) Among institutions
the applied (vocational) training centers were likely to be more lower middle class
than the theoretical research combines, thereby creating a prestige hierarchy which
was justified by claimed functional differences But despite vanations over time, na¬
tionality and Institution, the basic thrust of expansion and differentiation led to the
emergence of the middle class university
21
land, "Proletananizing the Student Body The Soviet Experience,' Past and Present, 80
(1978), 134-5, R Angelo, "The Students at the University of Pennsylvania and the Temple
College of Philadelphia;* History of Education Quarterly 19 (1979), 186, E O Reynolds,
The Social and Economic Status of Students (New York, 1927)
27 H Perkin, Key Profession The History of the Association of University Teachers (London,
1969) and The Origins of Modern English Society (London, 1969), J E Craig, Scholarship
and Nation-Building The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian Society 1870-1914 (Chica
go, 1983), D R Brower, Training the Nihiltsts Education and Radicahsm in Tsarist Russia
(Ithaca, 1975), R Angelo, "The Students at the University of Pennsylvania, 179-205 Cf
also B R Clark, "Problems of Access in the Context of Academic Structures, Yale Higher
Education Working Paper, 16 (New Haven, 1977)
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The causes of the broadening of access to higher learning are as vigorously dis-
puted as its extent. (1) The economic discussion revolves largely around the emer¬
gence of a mature industrial economy which augments certain strata (like plutocratic
entrepreneurs) and diminishes others (like the landed gentry and, because of agricul¬
tural rents in Britain, also the clergy). Moreover it involves the spread of prosperity
which made education available as a consumption good to larger groups. Similarly, it
focuses on the growth of science based and technological industries like electronics
and chemicals, which created a demand for trained manpower such as engineers,
chemists and the like. Finally, it also touches on the rise of big business which re¬
quired a new layer of salaried and College educated employees to administer its far-
flung concerns. (2) While conceding the significance of academic self-recruitment,
the social debate emphasizes on the one hand populär aspirations for mobility, espe¬
cially for those members of the new middle class who were emulating their work¬
place superiors. On the other hand it Stresses the importance of the preservation of
status through educational means, starting with the nobility and its endangered birth
prerogatives and descending through the plutocracy (for younger sons who could not
inherit) to the old middle class which tried to transform its meager possessions into
educational certificates. (3) The political argumentation centers on State policy to¬
wards certain strata (like the Russian nobility in the 1850s or the Proletariat in the
1920s) since admissions favored particular groups or discriminated against others
(antisemitic quotas for instance). However it also underscores the expansion of gov¬
ernment bureaucracy in the direction of the welfare state which created an intermit-
tent but generally growing demand for graduates as in Germany. (4) Taking for
granted the attractiveness ofthe ideal ofthe educated man, cultural explanations ad¬
dress the astounding populär hunger for self-improvement which often transcendend
any functional justification. While the effects of secularization on the cultural elite
have been widely discussed, the importance ofthe deauthorization of religion for the
middle and lower classes and the emergence of a pro-educational scientism need to
be probed further.28 Incorporating many aspects ofthe general transformation of so¬
ciety, these causative factors nevertheless found very real limits in resources, aspira¬
tions, institutional policies and cultural styles which preserved the continued exclu-
sivity of much higher learning.
What were the consequences ofthe emergence ofthe middle class university? Dur¬
ing mature industrial society the traditional elite system, mitigated by charity and pa¬
tronage, gave way to a modern, competitive pattern, characterized by the struggle of
previously uninterested (such as the wealthy middle class) or excluded (such as the
new middle class) strata for access to higher learning. A comparison of the fragmen¬
tary indices of recruitment (Table 6)29 indicates a gradual decline of the over-repre-
28. H. Kaelble, "Educational Opportunities in Europe, 1900-1970: The Emergence of a Pat¬
tern?" (paper delivered at the "Education and Social Change" Conference, 1980); P. Lund¬
green, "Besitz und Bildung. Einheit und Inkongruenz in der europäischen Sozialge¬
schichte?'* Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 7 (1981), 262-75; J. McClelland, "Proletarianizing
the Student Body," 122-146. Cf. Ringer, Education and Society, 71 ff, 157 ff.
29. The Cambridge and Oxford figures are from Kaelble, "Educational Opportunities," Tables
4 and 5 with a lower class figure added for Oxford on the assumption that about 50% ofthe
British population in 1910 feil into that category. The pre-1930 sample is recalculated from
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sentation of the elite and upper middle class and therefore a reduction in the dispar-
ity between upper and lower classes, as well as a gradual convergence towards a
common distribution.30 But the gains were not duplicated to the same degree by
working-class children, farmers' sons, the offspring of minorities, etc. They began to
make considerable progress in Russia and Britain, but still remained substantiaUy
under-represented everywhere. Moreover much of the new equality was rhetorical
rather than real, compensatory more than Substantive, since cooptation into the outer
layers of learning, the applied institutions, technological subject areas, or open facul-
ties like theology and philosophy, permitted the perpetuation of elitism in the more
prestigious professions such as law and medicine. By raising expectations while only
partially fulfilling them, this limited opening of higher education increased social
tensions within institutions. It also created political pressures which prompted the
first measures to reduce inequality and eventuaUy led to a new era of welfare oppor¬
tunities in the middle ofthe 20th Century. Ironically the influx from the lower middle
class and the limited inclusion of the working class helped to stabilize the system.
When the children of these educationally mobile children entered the university, they
contributed to "academic" self-recruitment, keeping its share at about 1/5 ofthe Stu¬
dent body from then on. Finally the partial broadening of recruitment also furthered
the importance of educational qualifications over job Performance in government
and business. Hence the middle-class complexion of the university served to legiti¬
mate its increasingly important selection function by blending cultured self-perpetua-
tion and status preservation with a degree of mobility based on meritocracy.31
The Process of Professionalization:
The newest focus of the debate about the transformation of higher learning is the
emergence of the professions. Rescuing the "forgotten middle class," i. e. the non-
J. Floud, "The Educational Experience," 137 f. The Heidelberg and Kiel figures are from Ja¬
rausch, "Die neuhumanistische Universität und die bürgerliche Gesellschaft," Darstellungen
und Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbewegung, Table 9; The German figures for
1930 are recalculated from Kaelble, Historische Mobilitätsforschung, Table 12 and Ringer,
Education and Society, 315. The Russian 1914 figures are from D. Brower, "Social Stratifica¬
tion," Table 2; the Soviet figures for 1923/4 and 1927/8 are from J. McClelland, "Proletar-
ianizing the Student Body," Table 4. The U.S. 1925 sample is calculated once again from
Reynolds, Social and Economic Status.
30. Some national pecularities in Table 5 deserve notice. Although virtually non-existent in Ox-
bridge in the middle of the 19th Century, the working-class had made considerable gains in
England by the 1930s. In Germany the opening was a victory of the new middle class (2.5
times over-represented) which means that Central Europe was most elitist by 1930, although
it had started out more openly. In Russia the change was most rapid and complete, so that
the Proletariat was over-represented (1.6) by the late 1920s. In America business representa¬
tion was particularly strong and the service occupations also exceeded the old middle class,
whereas the system appears more accessible for workers in individual institutions such as
Temple than as a whole.
31. The concepts of charity, competitive and welfare opportunities are from H. Kaelble, "Edu¬
cational Opportunities and Government Policies," part one; Cf. Jarausch, "The Social
Transformation ofthe University," 60ff, and "Die neuhumanistische Universität," passim.
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capitalist bourgeoisie, from oblivion, this concept draws attention to the social pro¬
duct of higher education, the academics, and to their impact upon society. Since con¬
temporaries talked about Berufsstand (occupational estate), in Central and Eastern
Europe the very term was a Western import, although its implications were very
much in evidence. If one accepts B. Bledstein's definition as a basis for discussion
("a füll time occupation in which a person earned the principal source of an income
... mastered an esoteric but useful body of systematic knowledge, completed theore¬
tical training before entering a practice or apprenticeship, and received a degree or li¬
cense from a recognized institution"), the crucial role of higher learning for the emer¬
gence of "the culture of professionalism" is obvious. Because of the slipperiness of
the concept, which is embroiled in an interminable discussion about a finite set of
ideal-typical traits, this analysis must be limited to its connection with higher educa¬
tion, whose importance can hardly be overestimated for professionalization. In order
to reduce the confusion, three preliminary clarifications are in order. (1) Although
the development of the professorial research ethic is central to the rise of the aca¬
demic profession, the professionalization of the callings of university graduates is
distinctive, broader and sometimes independent of higher learning. (2) Both pro¬
cesses within and without the university take place in an interactive triangle com¬
posed of the profession (with its practitioners and organizations), the State (as regula-
tor and certifier) and institutionalized higher education (as training ground). (3)
While expansion, differentiation and recruitment condition their interplay, higher
learning affects professionalization primarily in terms of admission (selection), cur¬
nculum (knowledge) and examination (credentialling).32
The relationship between professionalization and higher learning is, therefore,
more complex than assumed in static sociological theory or historical analysis, pro-
claiming it a dominant principle of contemporary society. Although "professional"
training had, in the Middle Ages, taken place in the universities, by the middle ofthe
19th Century liberal education and pure research had pushed much professional pre¬
paration outside, e.g. in England. Only in the present Century was it gradually reab-
sorbed by higher learning. Moreover the "old professions", usuaUy defined as the
clergy, lawyers, doctors (that is problematic especially in the U.S.) and professors, al¬
ready flourished by 1850 and therefore only expanded in size, increased in scientific
character, and somewhat opened their recruitment thereafter. The emerging "new
professions", such as high-school teachers, engineers, chemists, etc. were more inti¬
mately involved, since their victories in gaining university admission, in obtaining
scientific standing for their disciplines and in achieving a standardized and recog¬
nized set of examinations were both cause and consequence of enrollment expan¬
sion, differentiation and social opening. At times the resistance of the state bureau¬
cracy and of university professors to organizational pressures could defeat the aspi-
32. B. J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of
Higher Education in America (New York, 1976), 86 f; A. LaVopa, "The Language of Profes¬
sion: Germany in the Late 18th Century" (MS, Princeton, 1980); D. Rüschemeyer, "Profes¬
sionalisierung: Theoretische Probleme für die vergleichende Geschichtsforschung," Ge¬
schichte und Gesellschaft, 6 (1980), 311-325; K. H. Jarausch, "Higher Education and Profes¬
sionalization" (comment on a session on "Careers, Profession and Nineteenth Century
Higher Education" at the 1979 SSHA meeting at Cambridge).
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ration of an upwardly mobile occupation which carefully imitated the model of the
older professions. At other times they were deflected into less prestigious units, tiers
or types of institutions, even if they occassionally shared the same function as in
Tsarist Russia. Finally, the interaction between higher learning and professionaliza¬
tion also varied by social/cultural tradition. The liberal Anglo-American model was
characterized by vigorous professional Organization and autonomy (even in profes¬
sional training). In contrast the bureaucratic German-Russian pattern depended
heavily on State regulation and licensing, since all three corners of the triangle (pro¬
fessionals, officials and professors) revolved around government.33
Although some university spokesmen claimed to pursue only science (Wissen¬
schaft, nauka\ higher education, by also providing professional training, influenced
professionalization in three fundamental ways. First, formal admission requirements
and informal pressures of habit and expectation combined to create a clearly inden-
tifiable pattern of social selection among fields of study and institutions, which chan-
neled certain social strata into specific professions. Everywhere law was the most
prestigious faculty, attracting the nobility or the wealthy patriciate as well as some
children of academics. Medicine was somewhat more diverse with doctors' or apo-
thecaries* offspring, wealthy sons and some lower-middle-class children able to af¬
ford its considerable costs. Favored by sons of clergymen, Protestant and Orthodox
theology drew upon teachers* and peasants' children because of its numerous sti-
pends, while Catholic theology was even more lower middle and lower class. Finally,
the arts and science subjects were the true melting pot of the university, blending a
few academic children with sons of the plutocracy and especially of the old and new
lower middle class. The less prestigious institutes, specialized schools, etc., aside
from their practitioners' children, attracted an even less distinguished clientele ex¬
cept for some special Russian institutes and high technology institutions. Second, the
curnculum provided an aura of scientific theory, so important to the professional^
claim to superior expertise. However in practice the gulf between professorial re¬
search interests, the students' learning ofthe "scientific method" and the later needs
of the practitioner seemed to be widening, except in industrial research. Hence the
universities were less successful than the technical Colleges and institutes in impart-
ing practical skills which might be applied upon graduation without subsequent in-
ternship. Though less directly identifiable, liberal education also added an important
command of culture and that social veneer which made the graduate acceptable as a
member of the professional class. Third, the examination system, whether entirely ac¬
ademic (as for German chemists), bureaucratic (as for Russian doctors) or indepen¬
dent (such as the English bar examination), provided that essential proof of compe¬
tence upon which the professional based his claim to market monopoly. The clash
between the academic's insistence on intellectual attainment and the practitioner's
33. M. S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, 1977); H. Per¬
kin, "Professionalization and English Society Since 1880" (MS Princeton, 1979); R. Spree,
"The Impact ofthe Professionalization of Physicians on Social Change in Germany During
the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries," Historical Social Research, 15 (1980), 24-39; A. La-
Vopa, Prussian Schoolteachers: Profession and Office, 1763-1848 (Chapel Hill, 1980); A. En¬
gel, "Emerging Concepts ofthe Academic Profession at Oxford 1800-1845," in L. Stone, The
University in Society, 1: 322-338.
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emphasis on applicable skill, either divided the internal content of the examination
as in the West or established two successive theoretical and practical stages as on the
Continent.34
Since the numerical parameters of professionalization are somewhat indistinct,
there is little agreement on the reasons for the interaction between profession and
higher education. Focused on "the provision of an esoteric, evanescent, fiduciary Ser¬
vice" Western literature generally argues that
"
the professions were calied forth by
the free market." Hence the collective manipulation of demand by organized practi-
tioners who persuaded the public to grant them a monopoly in exchange for certain
Standards of expertise and skill became the central cause. However this liberal recon-
ciliation of free competition with economic security was predicated upon the victory
of the academically trained occupational elite over other practitioners, and therefore
involved higher learning at least as an important political tool. In contrast, Continen¬
tal scholarship stresses "the close association of many professions with the authority
and prestige of the State" which was the chief employer of older professionals, con¬
trolled educational requirements or testing procedures and regulated the practice of
the liberal professions. The ascendancy of the old professions like doctors over non-
academic competitors like surgeons, midwives, witches, etc. (in 1852 in Germany)
may well have been a matter of the Status policy of university graduates who per¬
suaded the government to disenfranchise the others even before medical science had
a higher eure rate than traditional folk healing. But once again the crucial argument
that convinced the bureaucracy rested on the higher learning ofthe true professional.
Because it was often used to gain power (such as by one professional faction over an¬
other), studies of professionalization ought to probe the educational dimension more
thoroughly than hitherto. The eoineidence between the rise of the new professions
and the transformation of higher learning is not entirely accidental. Universities and
especially technical Colleges produced novel careers through scholarly specialization
while aspiring practitioners time and again tried to legitimate their claim to profes¬
sional status through higher learning. Ultimately professionalization and academiza-
tion therefore fed on each other by continuaUy upgrading entrance requirements (i.e.
demanding more formal secondary schooling), making the curriculum content and
teaching style more scientific (even trying to transform legal Instruction from memo-
rizing rules into legal research) and by increasing academic demands for the various
certifying examinations.35
34. A. Engel, From Clergyman to Don The Rise ofthe Academic Profession in 19th Century Ox¬
ford (New York, 1982); C. E. McClelland, State, Society and University in Germany 1700-
1914 (Cambridge, 1980); C. E. Timberlake, Essays on Russian Liberalism (Columbia, 1972),
D. Light, "Introduction: The Structure ofthe Academic Professions," Sociology of Educa¬
tion, 47 (1974), 2-28. Cf. K. H. Jarausch, "Professional Education at German Universities,"
(paper delivered at the Western Association for German Studies meeting at Wichita State
University, 1980).
35. H. Perkin, "Professionalization," passim: Nancy M. Frieden, The Russian Physician, 1830-
1905: Professional, Reformer, Radical (Princeton, 1981), especially chapter 5, C. Huerkamp,
"Ärzte und Professionalisierung in Deutschland: Überlegungen zum Wandel des Arztberufs
im 19. Jahrhundert," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 6 (1980), 349-382; D Ruschemeyer,
Lawyers and their Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1973).
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The implications of professionalization therefore involve not only higher learning,
but also society and polity. Although the process began during the first half of the
19th Century, in the subsequent decades the academic career emerged as full-fledged
profession in its own right, structured into successive steps from Assistentur to Ordi¬
nariat, from tutorship to professorship. This process was accompanied by an increas¬
ing tension between professional training and liberal education. Expansion, diversifi¬
cation and social opening brought growing masses of vocational students into aca-
deme, but not only in Britain was the hold of neohumanism so strong that any num¬
ber of technical Colleges reverted to the arts curnculum and the collegiate model. Al¬
though in Russia technical training clearly won out by the 1920s, elsewhere the lib¬
eral arts (especially in the U.S.) showed a surprising resilience and popularity with
students. Hence it would be incorrect to assert that professional training had
triumphed completely. The very sequence of undergraduate study followed by a pro¬
fessional school, which emerged during this period, represents a compromise be¬
tween both demands. In a broader sense, the professionalization of academe also led
to a professionalization of society, since, however they were defined, the "profes¬
sions" multiplied more quickly than the population at large (Table 7).36 The older
professions academized, organized and grew moderately, thereby gaining and main-
taining an upper-middle-class position by combining a market monopoly with meri-
tocratic educational credentials. The new professions strove mightily to follow this
pattern through admission to some form of higher learning, recognition of the scien¬
tific nature of their expertise and establishment of certifying examinations based on
knowledge and skill. However many aspiring groups remained quasi-professions, be¬
cause their subjects were not academically recognized, their low pay consigned them
to the lower middle class, and their associations were too weak to wrest autonomy
from the public or the state. In creating professional status politics, professionaliza¬
tion contributed both to the spread of Liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe and
to its internal division between a commercial-entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and a cul-
tural-academic Bildungsbürgertum.37
Higher Education and "Modernization ":
The emergence of the large, diverse, middle-class and professional system of higher
learning between 1850 and 1930 casts a new light on the relationship between educa-
36. For the sources of Table 7 see B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract ofBritish Historical Sta¬
tistics (Cambridge, 1962), 60f. The first set of German figures (1852 and 1907) is from Ja¬
rausch, Students, Society, Table 2-3 as well as from T Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des
deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart, 1932), 20ff. (for 1925). The other numbers are from W. G. Hoff¬
mann, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft, 204 ff.
37. D. R. Skopp, "Auf der untersten Sprosse: Der Volksschullehrer als 'Semi-Professional' im
Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 6 (1980), 383-402; R. S.
Turner, "Social Mobility and the Traditional Professions in Prussia, 1770-1848" (MS, New
Brunswick, 1979); P. Stearns, "The Middle Class: Towards a Precise Definition," Compara¬
tive Studies in Society and History, 21 (1979), 377-396. The non-economic sector ofthe upper
and middle class has been consistently ignored by social historians preoccupied with indus¬
trialization.
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Table 7: The Professions in the Workforce in Percent
Britain Germany Russia United States
Prof & Prof & Acad. Prof & • Grads Prof &
1852
Servo Tech. Profs.
0.64
Servo
2.9 .69
Serv.
1871 3.9 3.0 .84 1.78
1890 4.4 3.5 .92 3.96
1910 4.1 1.16 4.6 .19 5.4
1930 6.1 2.56 7.9 .31 8.0
Note: The categorization of the British census figures changed during World
War One from "professional occupations and their subordinate Services" to
"professional and technical occupations." The last entry is for 1951. The
first German figures attempt to inciude only presumptive graduates of higher
education. In contrast the second German figures, according to census practice,
inciude government officials and free professionals (except for the military)
irrespective of academic qualification. The first Russian figure is from the
1897 census which indicates that 133,600 received some kind of higher education
out of a workforce of 69,148,022 males and females. The second figure from the
1926 census (when it was dangerous to be regarded as a professional) is 233,000
(while another one of 280,000 also appears). Both were averaged to about 250,000
and compared to a workforce of 80,453,000 (including all 15-60 year olds). The
figures were compiled by P. Aiston. The first U.S. figures represent college
graduates as proportion of all males over the age of 20. They were compiled
by A. Creutz and presented in a paper(calied "College Graduates and the
Professions in Nineteenth Century America" (MS Dearborn, 1980). The second U.S.
figures describe the percentage of the professional service category among total
American employment in 1870, 1900, 1920 and 1940. They were computed from
D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York, 1973), 130.
tion and social change. Sociological theories stressing "educational mobilization" ex¬
plain only the enrollment expansion and not even that very well. Since higher learn¬
ing does not necessarily grow directly with population, the spread of literacy and the
diffusion of primary schooling precede, but also sometimes follow, the expansion of
the universities, as in Russia. The "partial modernization" approach seems more at-
tuned to the contradictions in the differentiation process between scientific progress
and academic traditionalism. It reconciles the proliferation of non-university institu¬
tions with the continued magnetism of the most elitist (Oxbridge) styles of higher
learning. But its relevance for the other three topics is limited. The historical thesis of
the active incongruence of higher learning with change helps to highlight the dicho-
tomy between the commercial-industrial and the educational-bureaucratic middle
class and points out the obstacles to mobility for the Proletariat and other discrimi-
nated groups. But it overstates "the perpetuation of tradition" because "outlooks
more or less explicitly at odds with their time" were not so prevalent in the technical
and other non-university sectors and largely absent among scientists and doctors as
33
well. Instead, professionalization with its mixture of modern (science, skill, examina¬
tion) elements with traditional (Organization, autonomy, ethos) traits suggests as an
alternative the ambivalence of modernization. The ambiguity of the relationship be¬
tween education and social change emphasizes the dynamics of growth, diversifica¬
tion, social opening and professionalization while at the same time indicating their
very real limits. The adjective "ambivalent" also describes the academics' conflict of
emotions over the transformation of higher learning. While many enthusiastically
welcomed its research advances, at the same time they pessimistically struggled
against its decivilizing dangers.38
The ambivalence of this transition is evident in the different path followed by each
country. Starting with comparatively low relative enrollment, England expanded vig-
orously by adding a host of new university, technical and teaching institutions which
no longer conformed to the collegiate ideal. The social elitism of Oxbridge therefore
gradually gave way to a still somewhat narrow but accessible system, especially for
the lower class, since the hold of liberal education was broken by compensatory vo¬
cationalism. Beginning with higher enrollments, Germany increased more slowly,
pioneering the model of scholarly specialization and higher technical or business
education, but was more reluctant to inciude primary teacher training and other sub¬
jects. Its upper-class recruitment broadened only to inciude the new and old lower
middle class while keeping out the Proletariat. In contrast to English distrust between
the professions and the universities, the association of State, higher education and
Professionals became even more intimate with Bildung giving way to Ausbildung (cul¬
tivation to professional training). With the lowest original enrollment, Russia made
the most dramatic gains, less by expanding its universities than by creating numerous
higher institutes, especially from the 1890s to the 1930s. Thereby the most elitist (no¬
ble) system was transformed into the most open (at least for the Proletariat and peas¬
antry) at the price of legal discrimination against the educated and propertied middle
class. Instead of being content with democratizing the universities, the Bolsheviks
rather promoted the training of proletarian cadres, immediately useful for the pro¬
duction process of the first Five Year Plan. Having the highest enrollment, because
of the secondary role of much of undergraduate collegiate education, the United
States experienced further growth and continued to lead the other three countries by
1930. The staggering diversity of religious, regional, social and academic characteris¬
tics of institutions persisted, although a graduate university sector in the European
sense of the word emerged out of the traditional Colleges after the Civil War. Because
of its greatest initial egalitarianism (making some kind of educational certificate
available to almost everyone who wanted it), there was less subsequent broadening of
social access than in other countries. Curiously enough, professional education did
not displace the liberal arts, but in a characteristic compromise, was added onto the
38. W. Rüegg, "Bildungssoziologische Ansätze zur Erforschung des Bildungswesens im 19. Jahr¬
hundert," in his and O. Neuloh, eds., Zur soziologischen Theorie und Analyse des 19. Jahr¬
hunderts (Göttingen, 1971); D. Rüschemeyer, "Modernisierung und die Gebildeten im Kai¬
serlichen Deutschland," Kölner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft
16 (1973), 515-29; Ringer, Education and Society, 6ff., 18ff. For the ambivalence ofthe edu¬
cated cf. K. H. Jarausch, "Liberal Education as Illiberal Socialization: The Case of Students
in Imperial Germany," Journal of Modern History, 50 (1979), 609-36.
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undergraduate sequence for the most prestigious occupations while vocational train¬
ing became a lower class token alternative.39
The causes of the transformation are ambiguous as well. In contrast to contempo¬
rary rhetoric about the contribution of higher learning to economic growth, it has
been difficult to substantiate this connection beyond the effect of higher technical
and managerial training. Instead, the spread of higher education seems to coincide
with general "cultural and material progress" as a consumption good, afforded by
more parents of modest means. Despite the covariation of enrollment and industrial
production curves, predictions of demand have proved baffling for government sta¬
tisticians while the market cycies of deficit and oversupply seem impervious to bu¬
reaucratic manipulation. The role of education in the emergence of class society is
similarly contradictory. The shift from birth and wealth to expertise as a job require¬
ment opened the doors for some meritocratic competition, but continued to favor the
older elites. The formalization of legal entitlements (first on the Continent, but even¬
tuaUy also in the West) represented a typical liberal compromise between aspirations
for mobility and self-perpetuation of the educated. Nevertheless the "social-aristo-
cratic" tone of the cultured created one of the crucial status divisions of modern so¬
ciety. Despite the late 19th Century belief in the progress of science and technology,
the humanism inherent in liberal education continued to be attractive to students
who craved its social distinctions. While the rationality of higher learning contrib¬
uted to secularization, the classical content of cultivation sometimes turned academ¬
ics away from the cacophony of the machine and the masses, making them pro-
foundly uneasy about modernity. But exaggerated faith in rational knowledge and
populär scientism fueled the expansion of scientific and technological subjects as so¬
cial cure-alls as well. The rhetoric about academic freedom notwithstanding, the ex¬
pansion of state funding also led to increased bureaucratic control which decided
who got educated where and in what field. Though supporting science and technolo¬
gy, governments often tried to muzzle criticism coming from the universities.40 Eco¬
nomic growth, social aspirations, cultural values and state policy, therefore served as
essential motors of the transformation of higher learning across national frontiers.
39. The extant data in Ringer, Education and Society and the above tables are too fragmentary to
support anything but these preliminary impressions. According to issue, alignments of coun¬
tries differ. In terms of expansion the established British and German institutions grew less
dramatically than the emerging Russian and American Systems. In terms of diversity the
American and German Systems seem to have held the lead, at least initially. In terms of so¬
cial access Russia and Britain seem to have been the most open for the lower class by 1930.
Finally in terms of professionalization the Anglo-American association-autonomy model ap¬
pears to differ basically from the Continental (German-Russian) state-education model.
40. P. Lundgreen, "Educational Expansion and Economic Growth in Nineteenth Century Ger¬
many," in Stone, ed., Schooling and Society (Baltimore, 1976); W. G. Hoffmann, "Erzie¬
hungs- und Forschungsausgaben im wirtschaftlichen Wachstumsprozeß," in: G. Hess, ed.,
Eine Freundesgabe der Wissenschaftfiir E. H. Vits (Frankfurt, 1963), 101-33; R. Meyer "Das
Berechtigungswesen in seiner Bedeutung für Schule und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert,"
Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 12 (1968), 763 ff.; L. O'Boyle, "Education and
Social Structure: The Humanist Tradition Reexamined," Internationales Archiv fiir Ge¬
schichte der deutschen Literatur, 1 (1976), 246ff.; K. Vondung, ed., Das Wilhelminische Bil¬
dungsbürgertum (Göttingen, 1976).
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But their particular strength varied in each context, their force was buffered by the
relative autonomy of educational institutions, and their impact was mediated by the
conflicting decisions of corporate groups and individual actors.41
The implications ofthe transformation ofthe university into "an expression ofthe
age, as well as an influence operating upon both present and future" also raise a host
of puzzling questions. In the transition from traditional elite higher learning to mod¬
ern mass higher education the large, diverse, middle-class, professional system which
emerged around the turn of the Century represents an intermediary stage. Still echo-
ing earlier ideals, higher learning performed by 1930 a far broader mission in society
than a three-quarter Century before. Although resented by a cultured minority, the
expansion of enrollment beyond population growth moved universities from the pe¬
riphery into the center of cultural life. Through incorporating "secondary, technical,
vocational, and populär education", the diversified modern institutions played a cru¬
cial economic role in providing technological innovation and trained manpower. The
cooptation of the lower middle class increased the chances for mobility or status pre¬
servation, and therefore helped legitimate the continuation of privilege as meritocrat-
ic. Finally, the political "adulteration and dilution" of the curriculum to inciude
business, journalism, home economics, etc., contributed to the rise of ever new "pro¬
fessions". Nevertheless the emergence of "modern" higher learning before 1930 also
encountered definite limits. No country outside of America enrolled more than 10%
of the age cohort. Especially in the traditional British and German Systems scientific
differentiation did not mean the abandonment of the chair/institute system which re¬
stricted subjects to those deemed sufficiently "academic". Only in Russia were more
than 10% ofthe students recruited from the bottom half ofthe population. Finally,
even in the newest system the professionalization of vocational training did not in¬
ciude every new pretender to academic status such as "hair-dressing". The unre-
solved tension between modernity and tradition in this intermediary stage of higher
learning contributed to those pressures which led to the next transformation, the
emergence of mass higher education. In 1930 Abraham Flexner, in his grand compar¬
ison of American, English and German universities, could still cling to a vanishing
ideal:
A modern university would then address itself whole-heartedly and unreservedly to the advance¬
ment of knowledge, the study of problems, from what ever source they come, and the training of
men—all at the highest level of possible effort.42
41. M. S. Archer, Social Origins ofEducational Systems (London, 1979) and J. E. Craig, "On the
Development of Educational Systems," American Journal of Education, 89 (1981), 189-211.
Rather than nominalist abstractions, the intermediary Hnkages are crucial.
42. A. Flexner, Universities: American, English, German (London, 1930), 3-218. In 1967 Clark
Kerr wrote in his introduction to the new edition with all the arrogance of the prophet of the
"multiversity" before the Student revolution: "The universities did all the wrong things—un¬
dergraduate instruction, professional schools (other than law and medicine), service activi¬
ties, vocational courses, extension work. They did all the wrong things—and they entered
the Golden Age." For the ideological reversal of the educated accompanying the social
transformation see Jarausch, Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of
Academic Illiberalism (Princetown, 1982).
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